Political Writing · Foreign Policy
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary Japan is a significant partner of the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, including addressing regional security concerns, which range from hedging against Chinese military modernization to counter
Congressional Research Service· Library of Congress · June 6, 2006 · 5 min
Authorized reading. Congressional Research Service, Congressional Research Service. Public domain (U.S. government work, 17 U.S.C. § 105) View original source →
Summary Japan is a significant partner of the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, including addressing regional security concerns, which range from hedging against Chinese military modernization to countering threats from North Korea. The U.S.-Japan military alliance, formed in 1952, grants the U.S. military the right to base U.S. troops—currently around 54,000 strong— and other military assets on Japanese territory, undergirding the “forward deployment” of U.S. troops in East Asia. In return, the United States pledges to help defend Japan. The two countries collaborate through multiple bilateral and multilateral institutions on issues such as science and technology, global health, energy, and agriculture.
In the past several years, congressional interest in U.S. relations with Japan has centered on the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and particularly on how the governments of Japan and the United States coordinate their China strategies. In the 118th Congress, legislation has the potential to re-shape U.S. policy with Taiwan, which in turn has the potential to create a policy gap between the United States and Japan. In the event of a military contingency that engages the United States, U.S. bases in Japan would almost certainly be heavily involved. Another element of congressional activity on Japan is the encouragement of greater coordination among U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific and particularly in the often-troubled relationship between Japan and South Korea. Congressional engagement with Japan has grown in the past decade, evident in frequent travel to the country and the interest in the bipartisan U.S.-Japan Congressional Caucus with over 100 Members.
Under the President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida Administrations, the two countries have reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan alliance as a centerpiece of their respective Indo-Pacific strategies. Biden has emphasized rejuvenating bilateral alliances to deal with issues like North Korean denuclearization as well as China’s maritime assertiveness, human rights violations, and attempts to set new economic rules and norms through its growing outward investment. Both capitals view China’s policies and practices as a threat to stability in the region, and have coordinated policies on initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—known as the “Quad.” In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan imposed harsh sanctions and other financial restrictions on Russia. Japanese leaders are increasingly public about their concern with Taiwan’s security as linked to Japan’s own security and have moved to substantially increase their defense spending to respond to the changing strategic landscape.
Over the past decade, U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has improved and evolved in response to security challenges, such as the North Korean missile threat and the confrontation between Japan and China over disputed islands. Despite these advances, Japan’s government has indicated a goal of developing a more autonomous defense posture that is less reliant on U.S. protection. As Japan ramps up defense spending, Japanese policymakers are weighing to what extent they should devote resources to indigenous development or rather to focus on initiatives that deepen U.S.- Japan joint capabilities.
In the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022, Japanese politics remain dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its smaller coalition partner Komeito. According to public opinion polls, Kishida’s political standing is weak due to dissatisfaction with his government’s handling of inflation, a weak yen, and a scandal involving the Unification Church and fellow LDP members. Despite this lack of popularity, Kishida appears poised to remain in his position at least through next year given the weak opposition and internal problems within the LDP. Japan is to host the 2023 G-7 in Hiroshima, Kishida’s hometown.
Japan is the United States’ fourth-largest overall trading partner and Japanese firms are the second-largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States. Tensions in the trade relationship increased under the Trump Administration, particularly over its efforts to reduce the bilateral U.S. trade deficit, such as in motor vehicles, which account for roughly one-third of Japan’s annual exports to the United States. A limited bilateral trade agreement went into effect in January 2020 that includes some tariff cuts and digital trade commitments by both sides. Japan is likely to be an important partner in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, although Japanese leaders have expressed disappointment that the United States has not indicated it will seek to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade pact, previously known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
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Developments in 2022 ..................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Japan Strategy Aligns, with Converging Views on China and Russia .............................. 1 Japan Expands Its Defense Posture ........................................................................................... 2 Japan’s Transformational Defense Documents ......................................................................... 2 Kishida’s Public Approval Sinks after Abe Assassination ........................................................ 4 A Thaw in Japan-South Korea Tensions ................................................................................... 5 Economic Recovery from COVID-19 ....................................................................................... 5 U.S.-Japan Renewal of Regional Economic Engagement ........................................................ 6
Congressional Role in U.S.-Japan Relations ................................................................................... 7 Overview of U.S.-Japan Relations .................................................................................................. 8
Biden Administration Policy ..................................................................................................... 9 U.S. and Japanese Policy on China ......................................................................................... 10
The Role of Taiwan ........................................................................................................... 10
U.S. World War II–Era Prisoners of War (POWs) .................................................................. 12
U.S.-Japan Alliance Issues ............................................................................................................ 13
Mutual Defense Guidelines ..................................................................................................... 16 Collective Self-Defense .......................................................................................................... 16 Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa ........................................................ 16 Burden-Sharing Issues ............................................................................................................ 18
Host Nation Support ......................................................................................................... 18 Additional Japanese Contributions ................................................................................... 19
Extended Deterrence ............................................................................................................... 20
Ballistic Missile Defense and Strike Capabilities ............................................................. 21
Original author: Congressional Research Service
Original source: Congressional Research Service
Public domain (U.S. government work, 17 U.S.C. § 105)
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