NATO: Issues for the July 2026 Ankara Summit

Heads of state and government from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) 32 members are scheduled to meet for a summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8, 2026. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has outlined three core priorities for the summit: continuing to increase allied defense investment, bolstering transatlantic defense industrial production, and supporting Ukraine. In Ankara, allied leaders also are expected to address President Donald J. Trump's criticisms of NATO and concerns from some NATO members about the impact on NATO political cohesion and alliance credibility. A top Trump Administration priority for NATO has been to urge European allies and Canada to increase defense spending and assume greater responsibility for conventional defense in Europe.

Ahead of the Ankara summit, Secretary General Rutte has highlighted that European allies and Canada collectively have spent an additional $1.2 trillion on defense over the past decade, with all allied defense budgets reaching or exceeding 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025. In Ankara, Rutte expects allies to put forward concrete plans to meet NATO's new defense spending target of 5% of GDP on defense- and security-related spending by 2035 (including 3.5% of GDP on core defense requirements and 1.5% of GDP on defense-related expenditures). NATO allies also are expected to announce new initiatives to bolster defense industrial capacity across the alliance and tens of billions of dollars in related new defense contracts.

Another key priority for NATO officials at the Ankara summit is to continue institutionalizing long-term allied support for Ukraine, both from individual allies and from NATO as a whole. Secretary General Rutte has expressed support for Trump Administration-led efforts to negotiate a peace agreement in Ukraine and has emphasized that any peace settlement should ensure Russian President Vladimir Putin never again attempts to invade Ukraine. Some allied governments have expressed concern about perceived diminished U.S. support for Ukraine under the Trump Administration. These concerns have grown as some NATO and European officials report that U.S. military operations against Iran could lead to procurement shortages and delays that may affect assistance to Ukraine.

President Trump's statements criticizing NATO and casting doubt on the alliance's value to the United States have caused some allied governments to question the Administration's commitment to the alliance. President Trump's stated interest in acquiring Greenland—a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a founding member of NATO—has exacerbated these concerns for many allies. Administration announcements in 2026 of planned U.S. troop reductions in Europe also have caused officials in some European countries to question U.S. reliability and credibility as an ally. President Trump heightened his public criticisms of NATO in March 2026 as European allies declined his requests to assist in protecting shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz during the United States' and Israel's military operations against Iran.

Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949—including through Senate ratification of NATO's founding North Atlantic Treaty—and has played a role in shaping U.S. policy toward the alliance ever since. NATO-related issues of ongoing interest to Members of Congress could include allied defense spending, the future of U.S. and NATO force posture in Europe, NATO relations with Ukraine, and NATO's policies toward Russia and the People's Republic of China. More broadly, Members of Congress could consider a range of questions related to U.S. leadership of the alliance, including with respect to future U.S. commitments to NATO and European security, allied perceptions of U.S. leadership of NATO, and the costs and benefits of U.S. membership in NATO.

Over the past decade, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation expressing support for NATO. Some Members have portrayed such measures as responses to President Trump's criticisms of the alliance, including concerns that the President could consider withdrawing the United States from NATO. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 ( P.L. 118-31 ), for example, would require the president to seek the advice and consent of the Senate before a possible U.S. withdrawal from the alliance. Several provisions of the FY2026 NDAA ( P.L. 119-60 ) seek to expand congressional oversight of U.S. policy toward NATO and European security.

Heads of state and government from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) 32 members are scheduled to meet for a summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8, 2026. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has outlined three core priorities for the summit: continuing to increase allied defense investment, bolstering transatlantic defense industrial production, and supporting Ukraine. More broadly, Secretary General Rutte has said he hopes the summit will "breathe life into the concept of NATO 3.0: a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO," leading to "an alliance that is less dependent on the United States, but in which the United States remains firmly rooted." 1

In Ankara, allied leaders also are expected to address President Trump's criticisms of NATO and concerns from some NATO members about political cohesion within the alliance and NATO credibility. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has characterized the Ankara summit as "probably one of the more important leaders' summit[s] in the history of NATO," has stressed ahead of the summit that "[President Donald J. Trump's] views—frankly, disappointment—at some of our NATO allies and their response to our operations in the Middle East, they are well documented. That will have to be addressed." 2

President Trump's statements suggesting that NATO is a "bad deal" for the United States and that the United States has "never gotten anything" from NATO have caused some allied governments to question the Administration's commitment to the alliance. 3 President Trump's stated interest in acquiring Greenland—a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a founding member of NATO—and his intensified rhetoric in early 2026 about bringing Greenland under U.S. control exacerbated these concerns for many allied governments. 4 More recently, Administration announcements of planned U.S. troop reductions in Europe have caused officials in some European countries to question U.S. reliability and credibility as an ally (see "U.S. Force Posture in Europe," below). 5

President Trump heightened his criticism of NATO in March 2026 as European allies declined his requests to assist in protecting shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz during the United States' and Israel's military operations against Iran (some allies have said they would consider contributing to such efforts after hostilities have ceased; see text box below). Numerous allied governments criticized the Administration for launching strikes against Iran without consulting allies beforehand, and some allies, including Spain, France, and Italy, reportedly restricted U.S. access to their airspace and/or military bases for offensive operations against Iran. 6 In an April 2026 interview with a United Kingdom (UK) media outlet, President Trump said he was strongly considering pulling the United States out of NATO, partly in response to these allied reactions. 7 Section 1250A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA; P.L. 118-31 ) states, "The President shall not suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from [NATO] ... except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" (see "Issues for Congress," below). In a June 2026 visit to the White House, NATO Secretary General Rutte reportedly expressed his support for U.S. military operations against Iran and noted that up to 5,000 U.S. military flights launched from bases in Europe during the conflict. 8

Some NATO allies have expressed willingness to contribute to possible multilateral efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. In May 2026, the French and UK governments convened a group of 38 governments, including 19 other NATO allies, to pledge "their political support to an independent and strictly defensive multinational military mission" to support freedom of navigation through the strait. They underscored that such a mission would not take place until active hostilities had ceased, stating that the potential mission "will only commence in a permissive environment and in full accordance with international law and national constitutions." 9 At a subsequent meeting of NATO foreign ministers, some allied governments reportedly endorsed a possible NATO role in a Strait of Hormuz mission, though other allies reportedly echoed French concerns that "it is not [NATO's] purpose nor is it the right alliance to focus on the issue in the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz." 10 NATO air defense capabilities in Turkey have protected Turkish airspace since the start of the conflict, and other allied governments have deployed defensive capabilities to assist Cyprus (an EU member but not a NATO ally) and partner countries in the Middle East.

A top Trump Administration priority for NATO has been to urge European allies and Canada to increase defense spending and enhance their military capabilities for NATO defense and deterrence efforts. The Administration's National Defense Strategy, released in January 2026, articulates a parallel goal to decrease U.S. conventional military support for Europe's defense as European allies bolster their own capabilities. According to the strategy, "Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defense is the answer to the security threats it faces. The [Department of Defense] will therefore incentivize and enable NATO allies to take primary responsibility for Europe's conventional defense with critical but more limited U.S. support." 11 (The Department of Defense is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order 14347 of September 5, 2025.)

Administration officials have outlined a vision for NATO based on the main tenets of the National Defense Strategy. In February 2026, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby stated that the Administration's policy toward NATO "requires much greater efforts by our allies to step up and assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe." 12 (The Under Secretary of Defense is using "Under Secretary of War" as a "secondary" designation under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025.) According to Colby, the United States "will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. And [the United States] will also continue, in a more limited and focused fashion, to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO's defense." Colby has stressed that "there is nothing anti-European about this vision. To the contrary, it reflects hope and indeed confidence in Europe's capacity to act substantially and vigorously." 13

Some European allies view the Trump Administration's stated desire to reduce U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe and the U.S. President's criticisms of NATO, statements on Greenland, and lack of coordination with allies prior to operations against Iran as signs of a major shift in U.S. defense and security policy, with potentially significant implications for the alliance. Leaders in some European NATO member states have echoed German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's assessment that "a chasm, a deep rift, has opened between Europe and the United States." 14 In addition to addressing disagreements on trade policy and political culture and values, Merz and other European leaders have called for a Europe that is "much more independent from the U.S. in terms of security policy." 15

At the same time, some NATO and allied officials, including NATO Secretary General Rutte, underscore that the United States remains an indispensable member of the alliance, and caution that European allies and the EU could be hard-pressed to replace the full complement of U.S. military capabilities in Europe in the foreseeable future. 16 Rutte has echoed the Trump Administration's calls for increased allied defense spending and investment, credited President Trump with helping raise defense spending levels across the alliance, cited Trump as a driver of NATO's efforts to address security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China), and expressed support for a more robust NATO role in maintaining security in the Arctic region. 17 Secretary General Rutte has faced criticism from some European allies for expressing support for U.S. military operations against Iran. 18 Regarding broader discussions on the U.S. role in NATO, Rutte stated the following at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,

The EU is great. [23 of NATO's 32 members are also in the EU.] But [the EU] is only 25% of NATO's overall GDP. 75% of NATO GDP is outside the European Union. Let's not forget, that's a fact. The U.S. is by far the most powerful nation on Earth. And the President of the United States is therefore the leader of the free world. And you cannot envision NATO without the leader of the free world being an integral part of that organization. And nobody wants it, not on the U.S. side, not on the European side ... I have no doubt the U.S. will come to the rescue here [in Europe]. We will come to the rescue of the U.S. And we need each other for our collective protection. 19

Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine added urgency to longer-standing NATO efforts to increase allies' defense spending and investment. Secretary General Rutte has called for a "quantum leap" in NATO's defense capabilities in response to counter security threats posed by Russia, which he maintains could be ready to use military force against NATO by 2030, and the PRC's military modernization, among other potential threats. 20 In Ankara, Rutte says he expects all allies to put forward "concrete plans for increased investment." 21

At NATO's June 2025 summit in The Hague, the Netherlands, the allies adopted a new defense investment plan under which they agreed to "invest 5% of GDP [i.e., gross domestic product] annually on core defense requirements as well as defense- and security-related spending by 2035." The 5% commitment is to encompass 3.5% of GDP for "core defense requirements" and 1.5% of GDP for defense-related expenditures, including building relevant infrastructure and defense industrial capacity. Allies agreed that contributions to Ukraine's defense, including its defense industry, would count toward the 5% goal. Allied defense investments are to conform with new NATO "capability targets," including a fivefold increase in air defense capabilities, among other enhancements. 22